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To include religion in a discussion of emerging social movements in China would 
seem to be a natural thing to do: after all, one could argue that in China, the social 
movements with the greatest numbers of followers, the most efficient mobilizing ability, and 
the greatest capacity for resistance to government repression are religious ones. From the 
underground churches to Tibetan and Muslim movements to Falungong, organized popular 
resistance in China has frequently taken religious form since the late 20th century.  
And yet, an uncritical application of the sociological concept of the ‘social 
movement’, with its emphasis on conflict and a state-society dichotomy, to China’s religious 
sphere – and perhaps, by extension, to Chinese society in general -- risks blinding us to the 
true location and dynamics of social agency in China. While it is not difficult to identify 
religious movements of resistance in China, such phenomena merely represent a small but 
attention-grabbing portion of a broader process of the redeployment of religious networks 
and communities in their relation to society and the state.  
When we look closely at the theoretical literature on social movements, however, we 
come to the quick conclusion that, following the definitions given, strictly speaking, religion 
cannot constitute a social movement; even less so in China; in fact, it would appear that 
under China’s traditional and contemporary social and political structure, there can simply be 
little social movement of any sort. Considering this question, then, we risk repeating the 
debate of the early 1990’s about civil society in China, which did not reach a meaningful 
consensus (See the special issue of Modern China 19:2; Vandermeersch ed. 1994; Chevrier 
1995, Brook & Frolic eds. 1997; Weller 1999). If, as argued by Alain Touraine, civil society is 
the arena within which social movements occur, and which social movements seek to 
expand (Cohen 1996: 185-186), the results of that debate are highly relevant to the present 
discussion of social movements. One of the contributions concerning Chinese religion to 
that discussion, made by Kenneth Dean, underlined the growing social role of religion in 
rural Fujian, but critiqued the applicability of the concept of civil society to describe the 
public spaces opened up by the popular religious revival (Dean 1997). In another vein, 
Richard Madsen, in his sympathetic study of China’s Catholics as an incipient civil society, 
came to the sobering conclusion that although Chinese Catholic communities, particularly in 
the underground Church, engage in organized activity that is effectively outside of 
government control, ‘this independently organized social activity does not necessarily lead 
toward social self-governance in a pluralistic society. It sometimes leads to fragmentation 
and, potentially, anarchy’ (Madsen 1998: 127). Robert Weller, on the other hand, stressed 
both the resilience of informal social resources which could be mobilized by traditional 
religious communities, while stressing the split between amoral cults that accommodate 
themselves to the instrumental individualism of the market economy, and the voluntarist 
moralism of Taiwanese sectarian societies and new religious movements, which come closest 
to approximating civil society associations (Weller 1999: 83-84).   
In this chapter, I will therefore begin with a critical discussion of the concept of 
‘social movements’ as understood in the sociological literature, with an eye to its relevance to 
the Chinese case, and argue that any fruitful consideration of social agency in China will have 
to question some of the assumptions underlying Western paradigms of religion, resistance, 
and historicity. I will then examine the social dynamics of the resurgence of Chinese popular 
religiosity in two distinct forms in post-Mao China: the revival of temple cults in the rural 
areas, and the qigong movement in the cities. Data for the former are derived from a review 
of ethnographic case studies, and, for the latter, from participant observation and analysis of 
documentary materials produced within the qigong milieu (Palmer 2007).  I will then conclude 
by arguing that social agency in these movements has expressed two types of social logic: 
lines of division between distinct social actors in confrontation, approaching the classical social 
movement paradigm, and zones of multiplication of complex relationships between social 
actors, undermining the boundaries between them.  
 
Questioning ‘social movements’ 
 
 A quick perusal of the sociological literature on social movements reveals a 
widespread amalgam between notions of ‘movement’ and ‘protest’, ‘resistance’, ‘challenge’ or 
‘conflict’ with the state. Alain Touraine defines social movements ‘as organized conflicts or 
as conflicts between organized actors over the social use of common cultural values’ 
(Touraine 2002: 90). For Sidney Tarrow, a movement is defined as ‘collective challenges by 
people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, 
and authorities’ (Tarrow 1994: 4).  
 Common to all these definitions is the focus on conflict as a defining characteristic 
of a social movement. Another underlying assumption is that social movements are 
expressions of agency, of the ‘autonomy of social actors’ (Touraine 2002 : 92): they are the 
result of groups of people acting freely and collectively to achieve a common goal of social 
change or resistance to change. And yet, one wonders: is there no agency when there is no 
conflict? Is there no possibility of movement outside of protest? For Touraine, it would appear 
not: looking at Latin America, he concludes that ‘there are no social actors in this part of the 
world’. Turning his gaze to Eastern Europe, he finds, as well, ‘no new actors’ and that ‘the 
capacity for social agency in the present situation is much lower than we expected’ (Touraine 
2002 : 94). He would, no doubt, be even more disappointed if he considered China: classical 
social movements, in the sense of the labour movement, womens’ movement, 
environmental movement, and so on, are indeed very restricted in their capacity for 
‘challenging’ action in China.  
 Should we then conclude that there is little or no space for social agency in China?  I 
would like to argue that on the contrary, in a context of tight state control, religious groups 
and networks have demonstrated a high degree of resourcefulness in opening and creating a 
space for the attainment of their objectives. Elizabeth Perry, in her study of rural violence in 
socialist China, has stressed that the organizational base of popular rural protest has not 
followed the same evolutionary trajectory as in Europe, where reactive violence (food riots, 
tax revolts) of communal groups aiming to defend traditional prerogatives against an 
expanding state, gradually gives way, when the state and market gain the upper hand, to 
‘associational’ organizations such as trade unions which engage in ‘proactive’ collective 
action such as strikes (Perry 2002: 276, quoting Tilly 1975) – sectoral mobilization that could 
be considered ‘social movements’ in the classical sense. Rather, she notes, rural China in the 
reform era has witnessed the reconstitution of traditional social units with a religious 
component. But her presentation of religious movements in terms of popular revolts against 
the state and inter-communal violence, may obscure the complexities and ambiguities of 
popular religious groups in their relations with the people and the state. To adequately 
perceive their agency, it will be necessary to abandon two preconceptions commonly found 
in the literature on social movements: first, the assumption of a radical discontinuity between 
state and society; second, the assumption that conflict is essential to social agency. We will 
then be able to see religious groups deploying a wide range of creative strategies to protect 
their interests, expand, and effect or resist change, in rare cases exhibiting some 
characteristics of full-fledged social movements, but in most cases consciously avoiding 
conflict with the state, rather sharing zones of multiplication with the local state and other 
social actors.  
 Beyond issues of conflict and resistance, it will be fruitful to consider the underlying 
utopianism and historicity of social movements. Be they class-based labour movements or 
culturally-based environmental or feminist movements, the actors in social movements share 
a common explicit or implicit utopian horizon indissociable from the unfolding of Western 
modernity, a progressive evolution towards greater social progress through a historical 
dialectic in which societal change is triggered by underclass or subaltern groups challenging 
the centre or privileged classes, thereby forcing a re-ordering of social relations which moves 
society closer to the utopian ideal. It is through such a dialectic that a common social field 
comes into being, within which opposing protagonists interact and ‘battle for the control of 
historicity’ (Cohen 1996: 182; Touraine 1981: 31-32, quoted in Oommen 1996). In other 
words, the protagonists situate themselves on the same historical trajectory and clash over 
the control of its unfolding. Such historicity, however, is entirely foreign to Chinese religion. 
What happens, then, when Chinese religious sacralities and cycles intersect with the linear 
unfolding of rationalized ‘society’? To what extent can the mutual interferences thus 
produced be compared to social movements? 
 
Temple revivals in the Chinese countryside 
 
 Let us begin with traditional Chinese religion – often called ‘folk’ or ‘popular’ 
religion, which, over the 20th century, has largely disappeared from most mainland Chinese 
cities, but has undergone a significant resurgence in several rural parts of the country. The 
focal point of Chinese religion is the temple, which is simultaneously a sacred spot, a public 
space, and a social organization (Goossaert 2000). Two types of temple concern us here: 
temples for the cult of local gods and saints, which typically bring together all residents of a 
particular village or district; and temples for ancestors, called lineage halls, which are 
reserved for members of the same patrilineage. Communal worship at deity temples is held 
at regular festivals such as the god’s birthday or cyclical rites of cosmic renewal (jiao). 
Temples and festivals – which require a complex logistical organization -- are managed by lay 
committees whose members and officers can be chosen through a variety of procedures 
including selection by consensus, drawing lots, divination, or rotation among households. 
Troupes of local priests, who typically claim a Taoist and/or Buddhist affiliation, are often 
hired to perform the required rituals. All village residents or lineage members are expected to 
contribute financially to the construction, restoration, or expansion of a temple, as well as to 
the organization of ritual events and festivals. Temple and festival committees collect and 
manage these funds, as well as the funds collected in donation boxes and through the sale of 
incense for daily worship. As we will see, these funds may be spent for public or social 
services in addition to ritual activities.  
It is important to bear in mind that in Chinese religion, each temple represents an 
independent cult which has no institutionalized relationship with other temples or, for that 
matter, any other social organization. Temples do, often in a most dynamic fashion, cultivate 
relationships and maintain ritual alliances with other temples and social organizations, but 
never as part of a nested, institutionalized hierarchy. Furthermore, belonging to none of 
China’s five officially recognized religions2, most popular temples have no natural link with 
the state religious affairs bureaucracy, and are technically illegal. In some areas, there has 
been a trend to register such temples as Taoist or Buddhist, thereby, through giving them 
membership in local state-sponsored religious associations, integrating them in the state’s 
system of religious management. But, as I will discuss further below, the implications of such 
membership are far from representing simple subordination.  
With Chinese temples, then, we are faced with a phenomenon of hundreds of 
thousands of associations, largely independent of the state and of each other, which, in many 
villages, have become one of the main forms of local social organization. The extent of the 
phenomenon is hard to measure. Since it is not a unified, self-conscious national religious 
community – this type of religiosity does not have a self-recognized collective name and 
does not even traditionally refer to itself as ‘religion’, nor does it have any criterion for 
membership based on belief, it is impossible to compile statistics of ‘numbers of believers’ 
which could be compared to those of, say, Catholics, Muslims, or Communist Party 
members. It is possible, however, to quantify, at least in some better documented locales, 
numbers of temples and the frequency of their ritual activities, which are the main occasions 
in which temples play a significant role in social organization, community gathering, cultural 
production, and circulation of resources. One quantitative indicator of popular participation 
in temple life is the percentage of households in a given village who have contributed 
money, labour or materials to temple reconstruction projects.  
No national statistics are available, but one prefecture government report counted over 
10,000 temples in Yulin district, Northern Shaanxi province, for a population of 3.1 million 
in the mid 1990’s—an average of one temple per 315 persons (Chau 2005b: 21). In 
Southeast China, through a painstaking field survey of the Putian region of Fujian province, 
Ken Dean and Zheng Zhenman identified some 1,639 temples in the 600 villages of the 
region: 2.7 temples per village of 1,200 inhabitants on average—which amounts to one 
temple per 444 inhabitant. Furthermore, temple reconstruction ushered a renewal of 
community celebrations: in the area studied by Ken Dean, ritual events and festivals 
occurred within walking distance of the average village over 250 days per year (Dean & 
Lamarre 2003). 
These figures are significant because they can be compared to a China-wide estimation 
of one temple per 400 inhabitants in 1900 (Goossaert 2000). To be sure, Fujian arguably had 
a higher than average temple density, while the number of temples was very low in other 
regions, where local state agents were much less amenable to temple reconstruction and a 
renewal of ritual activities. But the high number of temples in the impoverished, landlocked 
North Shaanxi belies the assumption that popular religion flourished only in the more 
prosperous and liberal coastal areas (Weller 1999: 85-86). Such figures can only give us a 
limited idea of the extent of temple religion, since they make no distinction between large 
monasteries and small shrines, nor do they give an indication of temple activity: some may 
be dormant and others flourishing. In other parts of China, superficial observation indicated 
a much lower incidence of temple life: there were significant variations, not only between 
regions, but even from one village to another. The overall data, however, points to the 
exceptional resilience and dynamism of temple religion in some parts of mainland China, 
where it would seem to have reached levels of activity comparable to those prior to the early 
twentieth-century anti-superstition campaigns.  
This is all the more remarkable given that temple religion has been the object of repeated 
campaigns to destroy popular religion since the late 19th century, for both ideological reasons 
– the struggle against superstition – and practical ones – the expropriation and conversion of 
temples, which were usually the largest buildings in a town or village, into the infrastructure 
of an expanding modern state: schools, tax collection departments, police stations, army 
barracks, or government offices. The political significance of converting temples, as self-
organizing nodes of local society, into the specialized branches of a centralized bureaucracy, 
was not lost on local residents and modernizing activists alike, who, throughout the first 
decades of the 20th century, often clashed over the uses and appropriations of temples 
(Prazniak 1999; Duara 1991; Goossaert 2006).   
After 1949, the new socialist regime, which was able to penetrate deep into every village, 
had the means to effectively carry out, for the same ideological and practical reasons, what 
had been the longstanding Guomindang policy of eradicating superstition, to which was now 
added the additional stigmatizing label of ‘feudal’. And yet, while the general trend and 
political atmosphere of the first decade of the Peoples’ Republic made it increasingly difficult 
for temples to operate, and encouraged their confiscation or destruction by local activists 
and authorities, CCP policy was to focus on struggles against ‘landlords’, ‘class enemies’, and 
‘counterrevolutionary elements’ – who were often active in temple management – rather 
than on attacking temples themselves (Gong 2003; Feuchtwang & Wang 2001: 36-37). The 
press on occasion criticized fanatical activists who desecrated temples and ancestral halls, 
upsetting the people and thus causing them to support the landlords (Aijmer & Ho 2000: 
147). In parts of North China studied by Adam Chau, the social stability and economic 
recovery brought about by the new regime actually stimulated a new flourishing of popular 
religion and the reconstruction of temples destroyed by the Japanese or during the civil war, 
with the impetus now coming more from the peasants than from the overthrown landlords 
and rich merchants, who had been the traditional sponsors of temples (Chau 2003: 41-42, 
see also Perry 2002: 289). It was only in the mid 1960’s, with the Socialist Education 
Campaign of 1964 and the 1966 ‘Smash the Four Olds’ campaign of the Cultural Revolution, 
that rural popular religion and its temples were almost completely eradicated for more than a 
decade – although deity statues and sacred objects were often buried or hidden by temple 
activists, and low-key, secret ritual activity continued.  
With the more open climate at the end of the 1970’s, temples began to resurface. While 
the process involved the rebuilding and reopening of temples that had previously existed, the 
social context in which temple religion was reviving was completely different from that in 
which its traditional organizational forms had developed. The land endowments which had 
previously sustained temple operations had been appropriated by the state and redistributed 
to the farmers, and the gentry society and traditional political economy through which 
temples had played their social role at the centre of what Duara has called the ‘cultural nexus 
of power’ (Duara 1988), no longer existed. If, in the first half of the 20th century, temples 
could be seen as organic emanations of the old, ‘feudal’ order against which social 
movements mobilized peasants, workers, and women, the tables were reversed in the post-
Mao era: while the socialist order retreated from its revolutionary voluntarism, it was temple 
construction which mobilized people around new projects, often virtually from scratch and 
in an agonistic relationship with the state. It is in this limited sense that we can compare 
temples in the reform-era PRC with social movements.  
Typically, the first sign of temple revival was the increase in the numbers of worshippers 
who, sensing the more open political atmosphere, came to burn incense at the spot where 
the temple had previously stood – whether the original buildings were completely destroyed, 
dilapidated, or taken over for other purposes. Gradually, people would, in an unorganized 
fashion, clear the premises, install deity statues, and do makeshift repairs. The turning point 
occurred, however, when one person took the initiative to launch a full-fledged rebuilding 
project – an undertaking requiring significant organizational capacity as well as the ability to 
mobilize networks of support among villagers, donors, and officials. Each situation is unique 
and these individuals had a range of backgrounds and motivations. Specific examples 
mentioned in the literature range from a devout farmer and old soldier (DuBois 2005: 56) to 
an unpopular local Party secretary seeking to regain his lost legitimacy (Jing Jun 1996: 89). A 
common case was individuals who had been stigmatized with a bad class background during 
the Mao years, and for whom temple building represented a way of reclaiming and 
reasserting their identity and dignity, and regaining social status (Aijmer & Ho 2000: 207-209; 
Eng & Lin 2002: 1272). For example, a temple manager I interviewed in Lianshan, Northern 
Guangdong, was a retired primary school teacher whose landlord class background had 
caused him to be persecuted as a ‘Rightist’; with no place to stay in the village, he had taken 
up residence in the ruins of the local temple. Feeling that the god had protected him during 
those terrible years, he had arisen to rebuild the temple in the 1990’s. Another typical case of 
temple reconstruction occurred after cadres who had desecrated a temple or divinity statue 
were struck by sudden death or strange illnesses, prompting villagers to speculate that the 
god was exacting revenge, or when someone had a dream of the village god expressing 
resentment at not having a proper home (Feuchtwang & Wang 2001: 63).  
The group of people who helped the initiator of the temple project would evolve into 
the temple management board, in which the initiator may or may not continue to play the 
dominant role. The people most commonly active on temple boards are typically senior 
villagers interested in local customs and history, retired local government leaders and Party 
members with good connections and organizational experience, and younger entrepreneurs 
who treat temple activity as spiritual, symbolic and social capital.  
The most visible sign of a temple’s activity and influence is its festivals. The size, length, 
and occasion of temple festivals varies greatly, always following local custom. Occasions 
include traditional yearly festivals such as the Lantern Festival (yuanxiaojie), the birthday of a 
major temple god, or cyclical rituals of cosmic renewal (jiao) which occur every one, three, 
ten, or sixty years. A festival may last between one and ten days, and includes continuous 
rituals conducted by troupes of religious specialists, traditional opera performances 
(sometimes replaced by action film screenings) (Aijmer & Ho 2000: 214 n.7), a deity 
procession around the territory of the temple’s ‘jurisdiction’, competitive rites such as lion 
dances, dragon boat races, or rocket firing (siupao), and plenty of economic activity on the 
side. People participate in festivals both as individuals – worshipping the gods and enjoying 
the festive atmosphere -- and as representatives of sub-segments of the community such as 
lineages, villages, local businesses, or government departments. The atmosphere is one of 
‘hot and noisy’ (renao) sensory overload, with total attendance, in some cases, reaching the 
hundreds of thousands over several days (Chau 2005a, 262).  During and after the festival, 
gossip among villagers will evaluate the success in drawing and entertaining large crowds, 
and compare the festival with previous ones or those organized by neighbouring temples, 
putting the face and prestige of the organizers, and by extension of the whole village, at stake 
(Eng & Lin 2002: 1274). A temple festival is often the most significant and memorable event 
in the life of a rural community, becoming an important moment in the creation and 
enactment of local identities, and often the subject of intense rivalries between communities 
vying with each other to build the most resplendent temple and hold the most spectacular 
festivals. Indeed, the revival of a temple and its festivals often stimulates neighbouring 
villages to do the same, both to enhance their status and to build ties between villages 
through participation in each others’ rituals and festivals (Dean 1993: 9). 
All of this occurs in a political context in which most temples are technically illegal, and 
their customs and festivals stigmatized as ‘feudal superstitions’. Negotiation and tension with 
agents of the state is thus an inescapable feature of temple life, and has been described in 
detail by several scholars. A recurring picture emerges in several of these studies, of a 
constant ‘tug-of-war’ (Yang 2004b ) over the uses and appropriations of public spaces. Ann 
Anagnost thus cites the example of hundreds of rebuilt temples which were expropriated in 
Fujian in the 1980’s and converted into school dormitories, childcare centres, recreation 
centres, television-viewing centres, youth clubs, rest stops, and rain shelters (Anagnost 1994: 
221), and the confiscation of festival funds to build a reservoir. At the same time, the Fujian 
Daily denounced the conversion into temples of a noodle factory, primary schools, food-
processing plants, and cattle pens -- showing that the dynamic of temple revival and that of 
temple conversion occur in parallel, with buildings and spaces becoming the sites of an 
ongoing struggle between the state and local populations – in some cases expressed through 
demonstrations and riots led by spirit mediums and festival organizers against local Party 
offices, and in other cases expressed as a more subtle popular reappropriation, such as when 
old ladies disrupt school discipline by burning incense and worshipping in the midst of 
classroom activities (Anagnost 1994: 241-245). Ken Dean has described police interference 
in the 1986 and 87 procession of the Patriarch of the Clear Stream in Penglai township, 
Fujian, during which some Taoist priests were arrested and the procession disrupted. The 
authorities were unable to bring the festivities to a halt, however, and triggered such strong 
popular resentment that they were hesitant to interfere again (Dean 1993: 104-117; Dean 
1998: 269). One line of analysis has been to see this tension as an expression of popular 
resistance to state power. Anagnost thus states that labeling popular religion as ‘feudal 
superstition’ has invested it with a ‘potent means of expressing counterhegemony, a 
subaltern conception of the world, or system of value’ … ‘Ritual clearly becomes 
oppositional in that it reasserts local meanings and local identity against the more universal 
claims of the state’ (Anagnost 1994: 42, 245).  
Other studies, however, present a more nuanced analysis of the forces at play3. The 
theme of ‘microstruggles over space’ is further developed by Mayfair Yang, in her studies of 
popular religion in Zhejiang province. Yang stresses the overlapping uses of the same spaces 
by the state and religious cults, citing, for example, the case of a Wang lineage hall in rural 
Yongchang Township, which had been turned into an elementary school in the Republican 
era. In the early 1980’s, faced with the imminent demolition of the building, still occupied by 
a school, to make way for road construction, lineage members organized themselves as an 
archaeological relic preservation team, and successfully petitioned higher levels of 
government to have the site protected as a Cultural Relic. Both the state and the lineage then 
simultaneously invested the buildings with competing significations which coexisted side by 
side: at one time, ancestral portraits vied with political banners for the attention of the 
schoolchildren still studying in the building. Later, the school moved out when the local 
government turned the structure into a museum, dedicated to the building as an example of 
ancient architecture, but not as a hall for ancestor worship – in which, nonetheless, lineage 
members continued to hold their annual sacrifical rites. In 1998, the museum’s theme was 
extended to become a ‘Base Area for National Defense Education’, charging entrance fees 
for exhibits on military history and displays of tanks, fighter planes, and warships placed on 
either side of the main altar for the ancestor tablets. A giant white statue was erected in the 
hall’s courtyard, depicting two Wang brothers who led the anti-Japanese defense in the Ming 
dynasty. Thus, while at one level, the building appears as the site of a ‘tug-of-war’,  ‘a place 
for the competitive display of national sacrifice versus adherence to local kin and 
community’, at another level, the competing uses ‘perfectly encapsulate the convenient 
conflation of honoring lineage ancestors with paying homage to patriotic heroes who 
resisted foreign invasions of national space’: the state-employed managing committee of the 
museum is dominated by members of the Wang lineage, who are proud to have so much 
official recognition for their lineage hall, which is even designated as a provincial-level tourist 
attraction, with government funding to build an amusement centre for playing billiards and 
video games (Yang 2004b: 720, 734-738). Transforming temples into museums becomes a 
way for the state to appropriate local culture while freezing it (Dean 1998: 270). The state 
appropriates the space for its ideological uses, while the lineage hall obtains state legitimation 
and protection: these wills ‘coexist in an uneasy state of cooperation, tension, and 
interpenetration’ (Yang 2004b: 738).  
In their study of a stretch of road in Sichuan along the route towards Tibet, 
anthropologists John Flowers and Pamela Leonard explore the place of temples in the 
negotiation of local peoples’ memories and moral worlds in the face of successive civilizing 
projects (Flower & Leonard 1998; Flower 2004). Rejecting the discourse on ‘everyday forms 
of resistance’, they see a relationship of ‘mutual cooptation’ which they contrast to cases of 
peasant riots and angry confrontations which were recurrent in the same region in the 1990’s 
(Flower & Leonard 1998: 274-277, 280-287). They describe the reopening in 1992 of a 
temple to Chuanzhu -- the Lord of Rivers, who protects the community from flooding -- 
whose statue was destroyed by township government officials a few days before the god’s 
annual festival was to be celebrated. Just afterwards, a flood swept through the area, 
destroying many houses, the main road, and the township high school, a disaster which was 
interpreted by the people as divine retribution for the desecration, proving the efficacy of the 
god, increasing popular support for rebuilding the temple, and undermining the legitimacy of 
the local government. The anger of the god, a divinized figure of the ‘upright official’ Er 
Lang of the early Han dynasty, focalized popular resentment against the corruption of the 
current local officials. Later, when the local leadership team was changed, new Party 
Secretary Gao supported the temple in order to restore the government’s legitimacy, and had 
the government finance the renovation of the temple, on the condition that it be promoted 
as a tourist attraction and be integrated into state bureaucratic structures by being designated 
as Buddhist, with nuns from the state-sponsored Buddhist Association appointed to manage 
the temple. The temple enthusiasts were happy to participate in this cooptation, to a point: 
they accepted the categorization of the temple as a resource for economic development, 
while simultaneously holding to the legend of Er Lang as a moral criticism of the 
commercialization and commodification of society; and they accepted the Buddhist nuns, 
but had them accommodated in a new hall dedicated to the Buddhist Goddess of Mercy 
(Guanyin), preserving the original cult to Chuanzhu. A few years later, Party Secretary Gao 
was recalled, and the local government once again attempted to restrict the temple; Gao’s 
name, however, was inscribed on a new stone tablet in front of the temple, from then on to 
be forever associated with the upright virtues of the god Chuanzhu. From this account, the 
temple appears as a site where real conflicts between the state and local society are enacted 
and negotiated, and where universal civilizing discourses are intertwined with local memories 
and appropriated by the residents: ‘The temple gave [the farmer] hope not because it was 
‘traditional’, but precisely because it was a place where the subject of civilizing discourse 
could be engaged, instead of written out of the narrative’ (Flower 2004: 681). Feuchtwang 
and Wang have likewise noted how the image of temple gods and managers as righteous 
servants of the people, has come to combine village history and tradition with the collective 
values of public duty previously inculcated by the CCP (Feuchtwang & Wang 2001: 77).  
Turning to Northwest China, we can consider the case of the Kong lineage of 
Dachuan village, Gansu, studied in detail by Jing Jun (1996). This village had doubly suffered 
during the Mao years, firstly on account of the ‘feudal’ and ‘reactionary’ background of its 
dominant lineage, descendant of Confucius, and secondly since much of the village, as well 
as most of its graves, had been permanently flooded and forcibly resettled for the building of 
a reservoir. For the members of the Kong lineage, rebuilding their lineage hall and reviving 
its ancestral cult was a way of reclaiming their memory and rebuilding their shattered 
identity. While the temple rebuilding project was initiated in the 1980’s by an unpopular 
Party secretary hoping to regain legitimacy, he was driven out of office by younger Party 
members who were active in an (unsuccessful) campaign for compensation for the land lost 
to the reservoir, and who became, together with some old men who had received classical 
Confucian training in their youth, the core of the group of temple activists. In order to 
ensure legitimacy for the temple, its original purpose as an ancestral temple restricted to 
Kong lineage members, was doubled with one as a hall to commemorate Confucius as a sage 
of the Chinese people, and therefore a public site for the promotion of Chinese culture and 
national pride. However, the installation of a statue of Confucius, crafted in the manner 
customary of popular divinity statues, caused the temple to be viewed by most villagers as a 
popular god, able to answer prayers and cure illnesses, making the Confucius temple one of 
the major centres of folk religion in the area. Here, the temple was clearly a site for the 
expression of local tensions and political conflicts, but these were diffused by juxtaposing 
Kong clan identity, the state’s civilizing project, and popular religious culture.  
 In his study of the Black Dragon King temple in Yulin district, Northern Shaanxi, Adam 
Chau paints a picture of the emergence of a new type of local elite which draws its power 
from moral authority and access to tradition, in constant negotiation with two other types of 
local elite: business entrepreneurs and agents of the local state. His study focuses primarily 
on the latter, showing how temple boss Wang successfully ensures the legitimation and 
protection of the temple by having its old stone gate designated a cultural relic, by providing 
cash payments to police patrolling the huge annual temple festivals, as well as tax and 
income streams for the local commercial and electricity bureaus, and spending temple 
revenues on environmental and educational projects recognized and praised by the forestry 
and education bureaus. He finally succeeds in having the temple officially registered as a 
Taoist place of worship, at a ceremony scheduled to coincide with the high point of the 
Dragon King’s birthday festival, with the best opera performances in all of Northern Shaanxi 
and thousands of local festival-goers present. The ceremony brings into each others’ 
presence, mutually recognizing and acknowledging each other, the personal charisma of the 
temple boss, the divine power of the god, the political authority of the state representatives, 
and the communal energy of the crowds (Chau 2005a: 269)4. An illegal temple and an 
unpopular local state leadership thus used each other in order to obtain the legitimacy they 
respectively lacked: legal and political for the temple, popular and divine for the local state 
agents.   
Using the surplus funds raised through incense donation boxes, the Dragon King temple 
launched a reforestation project which won international acclaim as the only non-
governmental arboretum in China, and built a primary school which, with generous funding 
from the temple and excellent facilities, quickly became the best primary school in the entire 
district (Chau 2005a: 258-259). Indeed, in a context in which, throughout the 1980’s and 
90’s, the state increasingly disengaged itself from the village level, providing few resources to 
cash-strapped village governments and Party branches whose main function often came to 
be limited to the unpopular activities of tax collection and enforcing birth control policies, 
temples have frequently emerged as alternative centres of resource collection and allocation, 
to which villagers willingly contribute funds, which in many cases are spent by the temple 
board on local infrastructure such as the construction and repair of roads, bridges, schools, 
and even basketball courts (Yang 2000: 486-489).  In her comparative study of four villages 
in Jiangxi and Fujian, Lily Lee Tsai concludes that single-lineage villages which practice 
village-wide rituals or with an active temple association, ‘provide broad community networks 
that village officials can draw on for public services’ (Tsai 2002 : 9). She notes that the 
committees formed to rebuild temples and lineage halls often evolved into ‘community 
councils’ that organized religious, social, and philanthropic activities. While villagers would 
not contribute to appeals for funds by village cadres, they ‘willingly and universally’ 
contributed to public projects when solicited by temple boards. In one village, the temple 
committee’s revenue was four times higher than that of the village government, and had 
taken over all of the road building in the community (Tsai 2002 : 10, 11). Local cadres often 
sought the support of temple boards for their projects, and downloaded responsibility for 
social services to them, although they continued to take credit for their achievements when 
reporting to higher levels of the administration (Tsai 2002:  21-23). Thus, Ken Dean has 
claimed that popular religion has become a ‘second tier of local government’ in many parts 
of rural China (Dean 2001; 2003). In a township I visited in Northern Guangdong, temple 
board members were said to be ‘more powerful than the Party’, and, by circulating a petition 
signed by over 20,000 residents, had successfully campaigned against the local government’s 
plan to change the name of the township. And yet, relations between the temple board and 
the local state were cordial and cooperative, cemented by a father-son relationship: the son 
was the Office Director in charge of the day-to-day management of the township 
government, while his father, a retired primary school teacher, was the leading member of 
the temple board. In a case described by Feuchtwang and Wang, a lineage hall committee, 
which had been provided with an office in the village government building, ended up 
occupying its entire ground floor (Feuchtwang & Wang 2001: 64).  
Many studies have stressed the support given to temples and lineage halls by local and 
regional governments eager to promote tourism and to attract investment by overseas 
Chinese. In her research on the role of Singaporeans in the revival of religious activities in 
their ancestral villages in Southeast China, K. E. Kuah-Pearce has noted that while village 
cadres tended to support the revival of ancestor worship for sentimental reasons, officials at 
the county level also encouraged such activities for instrumental reasons, hoping that the ties 
thus created with Singaporeans would lead them to contribute funds to schools and hospitals 
and invest in infrastructures benefiting the entire county. Large scale religious festivals for 
the Patriarch of the Clear Stream, who was worshipped by most Singaporeans on trips to 
their hometowns, and whose temple was renovated with local government support as a 
designated tourist attraction, were staged with the active cooperation of the local authorities, 
which declared the festival a public holiday and had the schools closed, while pupils 
performed dances and musicals and were provided with dress, drinks, and pocket money by 
the festival organizers (Kuah-Pearce 2000: 167,185,190).5  In other cases described by Göran 
Aijmer and Virgil C. Y. Ho, temple activists and enthusiastic local cadres successfully ‘used’ 
Hong Kong connections to press for recognition by higher levels of government, asking 
their Hong Kong kin to intervene with the authorities, and even to threaten – successfully -- 
that they would destroy the roads they had funded if a Provincial Work Team, sent down to 
supervise an anti-superstition campaign in 1993, insisted on confiscating two modest village 
temples (Aijmer & Ho 2000: 224).  
Some local cults have also been used by state agents to promote China’s political 
reunification: most notable has been the use of the cult of Mazu, billed in the Chinese press 
as the ‘Sea Goddess of Peace in the Taiwan Strait’ (Peoples’ Daily Overseas Edition, April 22, 
1987, quoted in Liu 2005: 3). Taiwanese temples contributed financially and organized large-
scale pilgrimages to the ancestral temple in Meizhou, Fujian – activities legitimized by state 
agencies’ encouraging the organization of academic conferences on local gods to which local 
scholars, temple activists, and overseas donors were invited (Dean 1993: 92) -- although, as 
noted by Yang, rather than leading to political unification, ‘cross-strait Mazu pilgrimages are 
creating a regional ritual space and religious community of Chinese coastal peoples that do 
not conform to existing political borders’ (Yang 2004a: 216). Attempting to replicate the 
Mazu model and hoping to build ties with Hong Kong and Macau residents, the Shenzhen 
Cultural Bureau rebuilt the Chiwan Tianhou temple in 1992 as an uneasy hybrid of secular 
museum and place of worship (Liu 2005).  This case, of a temple built by the government 
itself, is also increasingly common, as local authorities attempt to appropriate the popularity 
of religious activity and profit from its revenue streams, either by building new temples or 
taking over existing ones6. The temple of the Patriarch of the Clear Stream, mentioned 
above, was even the object of a struggle for control between local and provincial levels of 
government (Dean 1993: 126).  
 
From the cases studied above, it is obvious that rural temple revivals do express conflicts 
over what Touraine calls the ‘appropriation of historicity’ (Touraine 1988: 68), or the 
respective roles and powers of social groups in the collective development of society. While 
social movements are struggles over conflicting interpretations of shared universal norms 
and utopian values, and are thus contests taking place between actors within the same 
linearity of history, temple revivals disrupt the centralized, developmental historicity of the 
nation-state, rewinding local communities into overlapping cyclical time-frames of festivals 
and ritual events. And yet, in their relations with the nation-state and its civilizing projects, 
by participating in the local elaboration and appropriation of developmental discourses and 
practices on patriotism, the economy, tourism, cultural preservation, and education, they do 
open up a peculiar type of ‘public sphere’ which is highly charged by the tension between 
incommensurable spacialities and temporalities. Thus, while they clearly express the assertion 
of local identities, they fit into neither of the extreme models of identity identified by 
Touraine as disqualifying a group as a social movement: their behaviour is not one of seeking 
‘pure identity’ through withdrawing from active engagement with social change; nor do they 
display the ‘purely strategic’ model of groups competing for power and privilege within a 
social structure which is not contested (Cohen 1996: 183). A temple is not an interest group 
but a type of social, spacial, and temporal organization which can be invested by different 
groups, networks, and even the state itself in the pursuit of their respective interests. While 
temples do not explicitly challenge the political order, rather, when necessary, trying to 
inscribe themselves into it through the legitimacy provided by the labels of ‘cultural relic’, 
‘tourist site’, ‘designated site for religious activities’, ‘patriotic education’, or ‘economic 
development’, the interpenetration of the temple and the modern state as mutually alien 
forms of social organization, can only lead to changes in the local political order.   
It is an interaction in which several logics may operate at the same time. From the 
perspective of the totalistic ideological discourse of the state, which operates on binary 
dichotomies between the developed and the backward, the modern and the superstitious – 
what I term lines of division -- the reality in the field can only appear incongruous, and only 
three options are conceivable: to rename the phenomenon, as mentioned above, by 
inscribing it into legitimate categories; to ignore it; or to eliminate it. There can be no 
surprise, then, that whenever popular religion is not ignored or renamed by the official 
media or policy, it is always denigrated and attacked with anti-superstition discourses and 
campaigns – and that the earlier studies which have relied primarily on Chinese official 
newspaper reports – notably Perry’s and Anagnost’s – have thus focused on dimensions of 
repression, conflict, and resistance.  
But later researches in the field have uncovered a more subtle dynamic7, which could be 
termed as one of zones of multiplication. Multiplication can be understood in terms of 
increasing numbers of new autonomous units often connecting with each other in 
‘rhizomatic networks’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 20, 31), which is how the spread of temple 
religion can be described, as opposed to the growth of a single social body. It can also be 
understood as the multiplication of relationships between beings of a different nature: gods, 
humans, state agencies, producing an entirely new reality each time a term of the equation is 
modified. As shown by Adam Chau, the temple blasts open the state’s monolithic discourse 
about itself, revealing a profusion of ‘linking and articulating channels’ between the temple 
and different local state agencies, while the latter likewise establish channels with multiple 
individuals and popular organizations, through which circulate healings, money, gifts, status, 
protection, tributes, deference, and legitimacy (Chau 2005a: 268-69). Ken Dean has 
suggested thinking of a ‘floating signifier’ released into the sociopolitical system by Taoist 
ritual, which provides ‘lines of flight’ from the ‘despotic signifier’ of Imperial power (Dean 
1993: 184, 185). The multiplying logic of the temple also operates in the relationships 
between divinity statues, temple managers, local worshippers, state officials, overseas 
pilgrims, geomancers, business entrepreneurs, and priests – each of which enter the sacred 
space with differing sets of motivations, cosmologies, and pantheons, producing an infinite 
range of intersecting connections and dissolving all attempts to impose fixed lines of 
division.  
 
The qigong movement 
 
 Turning to qigong, we can see a similar interplay between lines of division and zones 
of multiplication, but in which there was a conscious attempt to invest the unfolding 
historicity of modernity, producing a phenomenon which came much closer to resemble a 
social movement. The modern category of qigong was devised at the end of the 1940’s in the 
nascent health bureaucracy of the ‘Liberated Zone’ of South Hebei, and established as a sub-
discipline of Chinese medicine within the medical institutions of the new Peoples’ Republic 
during the 1950’s. Defined as ‘breath training’ and including body, breathing, and mental 
exercise regimens, the category aimed to integrate, standardize, and secularize the vast array 
of traditional body cultivation and meditation techniques, which had typically been practiced 
in religious settings and transmitted through ‘feudal’ master-disciple relationships, but which 
were seen as having positive benefits for health. Following the logic of lines of division, the 
project of qigong was to separate the physical body techniques from the dross of feudal and 
superstitious symbols, customs, and social relations, turning them into a scientific clinical 
practice that could be harnessed at low cost to train the healthy bodies of New China’s 
people. In practice, during the 1950’s and early 1960’s, qigong clinics provided relief for the 
mentally stressed Party elite at hospitals and sanatoria such as the Beidaihe beach resort 
(Palmer 2007: 29-45).  
 During its first phase, qigong was entirely instrumentalized by the state and could 
hardly be considered a movement. But, after more than a decade during which the qigong 
institutions had been closed during the Cultural Revolution, qigong reappeared in the late 
1970’s and increasingly took the form of a popular movement. Operating outside of the 
medical institutions, some qigong activists created their own standardized sets of exercises, 
which were practiced by groups of people in parks. Thousands of charismatic ‘qigong masters’ 
emerged from obscurity, claming to have  secretly nurtured their powers during the Cultural 
revolution, and now ‘came out of the mountains’ to heal the sick and save humanity from 
suffering. Laboratory experiments which appeared to prove the material existence of the 
vital force or ‘external qi’ emitted by masters towards patients from a distance, gave a 
scientific basis to the mysterious powers of the masters, and pointed to qigong exercises as the 
key to unlocking the paranormal abilities which lay latent in every human being. This 
tantalizing possibility was enthusiastically taken up by key members of China’s scientific elite, 
especially within the military and nuclear technology establishments, who enlisted leading 
figures in the CCP to support the dream of a new ‘somatic science’ which would trigger a 
new worldwide scientific revolution under Chinese leadership (Palmer 2007: 46-85).  
 The standardized sets of qigong exercises, called gongfa in Chinese, each had a name, 
such as ‘Xianggong’ (‘aromatic qigong’) or ‘Zhinenggong’ (‘intelligent qigong’) and were 
associated with a qigong master, who was the author or inheritor of the method. Although a 
gongfa technically referred to a set of exercises, in practice each gongfa was the basis of a 
training network linking the master to hundreds, thousands, or even millions of 
practitioners. Each gongfa was transmitted to the mass of practitioners by networks of 
trainers in local practice points throughout a region, the country, and often even abroad. As 
networks, they involved both vertical communication between the master, his disciples and 
trainers, and the practitioners, as well as horizontal communications between network 
members. Most gongfa networks registered as ‘research societies’ under the umbrella of state-
sponsored national, provincial, and municipal federations which were typically led by well-
connected retired government and party leaders who practiced qigong themselves, and which 
operated under the patronage of government ministries (health and sports) and official 
Science and Technology associations (Palmer 2007: 183-218). Newspapers reported the 
healing miracles of the masters as phenomena at the frontiers of cutting-edge science, while 
best-selling books on the ‘grandmasters’ such as Yan Xin and Zhang Hongbao, spawned a 
publishing industry.   
 By the second half of the 1980’s, qigong had become a mass phenomenon, promoted 
and carried forward by several distinct groups of people: the qigong masters, the paranormal 
scientists, the retired Party leaders, the health and sports officials, and the multitudes of 
ordinary practitioners. It is hard to estimate the number of persons who practiced qigong. 
While the figure of over 100 million is often mentioned, it would be more realistic to 
consider that regular practitioners at the peak of the qigong craze numbered around 10 
million, while several times as many people practiced occasionally, attended healing sessions, 
or had other direct experiences of qigong. Given that qigong was largely an urban 
phenomenon, and that the majority of practitioners were women and seniors, this figure still 
represents a significant proportion of those categories of the population8.  
The leading figures among those who practiced, studied, and promoted traditional 
Chinese body technologies under the name qigong described themselves as the ‘qigong sector’ 
(qigong jie). They were active in a social space I call the ‘qigong milieu’: a nebula of networks 
and associations which expanded massively in the 1980’s. The qigong milieu was a space of 
relative freedom in which, between 1979 and 1999, many types of popular activities and 
networks flourished: the group practice sessions in public parks, the therapeutic encounters 
and healing sessions, the training workshops, the academic conferences, and the ritualized 
meetings of state-supervised associations; the interconnected networks of qigong associations, 
organizations, and institutions; and the popular qigong magazines and books through which 
qigong discourse was elaborated, debated, and diffused. Within the qigong milieu, people 
exercised their bodies and minds, practiced divination and laboratory experiments, and 
discussed subjects as varied as Buddhism, Daoism, the scientific method, health 
maintenance, and the progress of Chinese culture. Thousands of masters competed in an 
emerging market for qigong health, healing, and spiritual arts, each proposing his own package 
of exercises and theories. Debates raged on the effects and powers attributed to qigong. The 
training and practice networks founded by hundreds of masters may well have formed 
China’s greatest collection of popular associations during the period, and, in the words of 
Zhu and Penny, ‘probably the greatest mass movement in modern China that was not under 
direct government control.’ (1994:3). The groups within the qigong  milieu were characterized 
by extreme diversity and fragmentation, but this centrifugal tendency was countered by, 
firstly, a mystical and syncretistic outlook that encouraged tolerance and mutual receptivity, 
and secondly, a sense of cultural marginality bordering on the heterodox, leading to a 
common consciousness of the need to justify themselves in relation to the ridicule that could 
be directed at them from the perspective of conventional Western scientism and orthodox 
Marxism9. These counter-centrifugal tendencies facilitated the circulation of people and ideas 
between diverse groups.  
 When we look at the relationship of the qigong milieu with the larger society, qigong can in 
some ways be seen as a social movement. Qigong was characterized by social mobilization, in 
which there was increased communication and common action between people from different 
backgrounds, social spheres, and regions, on a national and even global scale, as they promoted 
their common goals. What started with decentralized, non-coordinated initiatives in the mid to 
late 1970’s quickly took a life of its own and acquired organizational capacity within a few 
years, with a core network of influential political leaders, scientists, and masters who were able 
to assume leading roles within the movement and to articulate and promote a common vision 
and discourse. The social goals upheld by the movement included improving the health of the 
masses, bringing about a renaissance of traditional Chinese culture, and triggering a Chinese-
led scientific revolution which would lead to a paranormal utopia. These goals were formulated 
as fitting within, and even as potentially spearheading, the unfolding of the Marxist teleology of 
national progress: qigong, which had been the source of Chinese civilization in its Golden Age, 
had been restricted, exploited, and driven underground by feudal powers and religious dogmas 
for over 2000 years, but it was now reviving, flourishing, and triggering scientific 
breakthroughs and a cultural renaissance in the new era opened by the Chinese Communist 
Party (Palmer 2007: 86-101).  
 From the beginning of the movement in 1979, this utopian vision of qigong and its 
scientific premises was attacked by a number of scientists and ideologues, and polemics on 
both sides of the issue were often aired in the press (Palmer 2007: 158-182), producing what 
we might call a conflict over the interpretation and control of historicity – and yet, until the 
second half of the 1990’s this conflict was largely restricted to the press, and was hardly 
expressed as a struggle between opposing social groups. On the contrary, certain state agencies 
and political networks were actively supporting the movement, making it as much a top-down 
as a bottom-up phenomenon. The qigong movement was termed by commentators as a re, a 
‘fever’ –  one of the countless cultural crazes which swept post-Mao China in the 80’s and 90’s, 
ranging from ‘culture fever’ to ‘Mao fever’ to ‘stock market fever’. The ‘fever’ can be situated 
somewhere between the political campaigns or ‘movements’ (yundong) of the Mao era, and the 
fully commoditized consumer fads of capitalist societies: a ‘fever’ is a form of collective 
effervescence which occurs when official policies and informal signals sent from above 
correspond with, open the space for, and amplify popular desire, which appropriates these 
spaces in unexpected ways, simultaneously complying with, appropriating, disrupting, and 
mirroring the projects of state hegemony. Thus, in qigong, the official campaign to promote 
science and technology as the foundation of Deng’s Four Modernizations, was enthusiastically 
taken up by the qigong milieu and recast as a call to encourage the mass propagation of 
breathing exercises as a stage in China’s cultural and scientific renaissance. As ‘moments when 
an entire cultural area (often all of urban China, sometimes the nation as a whole) is unified by 
a common activity’, as described by Ellen Hertz  (1998: 82),10 fevers create a social sphere in 
which, unlike temple revivals, all the actors operate within the roughly corresponding spatial 
and temporal frames of the nation and its historicity.  
The qigong episode thus forces us to abandon a conflictual model that places state 
authority in opposition to the autonomy of individuals and popular groups. It shows a 
movement that developed through the interpenetration of networks, groups, institutions, 
practices and conceptual systems, in which it is impossible to fully separate the state and 
popular groups as distinct entities. An image of the state as a monolithic entity makes way 
for a landscape of interconnected persons, networks and institutions that advance, retreat, 
cross each other and turn around, link up, pass each other, collide, expand and influence 
each other, reaching to the edges of society, without ever completely covering it. It is 
difficult to draw a clear line between what is within the state and outside of it. ‘The extra-
institutional is co-extensive with the state, […] it is structuring, not only deforming.’ 
(Chevrier 1995: 171). It is within such a system, and not outside of it, that qigong groups were 
formed and expanded.   
The case of qigong thus reveals a dynamic that is often contrary to the processes of 
individualization and institutional differentiation characteristic of Western paradigms of 
modernity. This begins with the dispositions and orientations nurtured by the body practices 
themselves. Western sports and physical training produce power at the point of friction 
between discrete material bodies. Muscles are trained against the resistance of external 
objects. The body’s power is measured against disembodied targets. Physical, mental, 
emotional, and moral abilities are the subject of separate training regimens. Chinese body 
technologies, on the other hand, reveal an opposite tendency: the concentration of all forms 
of power into the cosmic centre of the body, usually named dantian, the elixir field beneath 
the navel, evoking metaphors of the alchemical furnace in which heterogeneous elements are 
forged into a single elixir, itself a sign of the primal unity of the Dao. Collecting, cultivating, 
and concentrating energies leads to an inner connection with the ultimate cosmic Power. 
The energies to be collected are not only inside the body but outside as well, including the 
powers of the sun, of the moon, of trees, of animals, of other people, and of symbols: hence 
the attempts to draw on and fuse the different traditions of Daoism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, Martial Arts, Medicine, and Science. Power is generated, not through friction, 
but through fusion, through entering into a mutually transforming resonance with the object: 
absorbing the energy of a tree, for instance, does not involve pushing against it: rather, 
relating to the tree in such a manner that the flow of energies within it passes to the body of 
the practitioner. In qigong, the body becomes the ultimate multiplicator, enabling the 
practitioner to combine, through direct practice and visceral experience, domains as varied as 
physics, physical exercise, mysticism, calligraphy, illness narratives, science fiction, the 
refinement of saliva, martial arts heroism, medicine, archaeology, the comparative study of 
civilizations, enhancing and/or controlling sexual potency, biology, physiognomy, workplace 
stress management, scientific methodology, national essence, and regulation of the digestive 
system, among other things. Each line of division applied to qigong by modern discourses, 
each of which had its corresponding institutions, such as those which separate the categories 
of science, tradition, religion, sports, medicine, and national defense, only served to open 
new zones of multiplication between them, producing dense networks, not only of 
signification, but also of social relationships between people from different social spheres.  
The intermediate space of qigong  was not autonomous. It was simultaneously co-
opted by the state and popular groups: each tried to use qigong for its own ends. If the state 
encouraged the development of qigong circles and gave them institutional support, it was as 
an instrument of its objectives in health, science, and national identity. Its support for the 
construction of a unified national qigong community aimed to co-opt and control it. In 
exchange, popular qigong groups obtained an institutional legality and legitimacy that 
permitted their massive expansion. Qigong could thus prosper by combining the institutional 
support of the state and the dynamism of popular groups.  
But the multiplying logic of the qigong movement is perhaps what led to its own 
dissolution and to its polarization through the Falungong episode. By the mid 1990s, the 
trend towards wholesale Westernization and capitalism had become so overwhelming in 
China that qigong dreams of reconciling science, tradition, and utopian ideals fell by the 
wayside. Interest in creating a distinctive Chinese science faded, as power in the Chinese 
scientific community shifted from the more nationalist military establishment to civilian 
institutions increasingly engaged in international exchanges and interested in applying 
universally-recognized standards and methods (Wang, Yeu-Farn 1993: 115-141). The 
idealized body was now that of the hedonistic consumer of fashion, beauty products, plastic 
surgery, and sexual pleasure (Brownell 1998; Johansson 1998). Traditional culture became a 
commodity, a resource to extract and package for the booming markets of tourism, leisure, 
and health (Cingcade 1998).  
 In the new context, the qigong movement was led to a point of bifurcation, reflecting 
what Weller has called a ‘split-market culture’ in which religious groups, in the transition to a 
capitalist market economy, either accept or reject its amoral individualism (Weller 1999: 83-
105). Much of the movement followed the trend of the times, towards increased 
commodification and commercialization within a framework of bureaucratic regulation. The 
market for qigong was considerable – but the entrepreneurial business practices of many qigong 
masters triggered controversies over ‘fakes’, ‘forgeries’, and ‘swindling’. Such issues were 
concerns of public discourse about most types of market commodities in China, at a time 
when consumer rights and principles of business accountability and integrity were still new 
to the emerging Chinese economic culture. Such practices dissolved the utopian élan of the 
qigong movement, making qigong masters appear no different from other profit-hungry 
businessmen. Tainted by controversy and under renewed attack by the scientific community, 
political backing for commercialized qigong dwindled.   
In this context, Li Hongzhi, who had founded Falungong as a qigong method in 1992, 
attacked the overall direction of the qigong movement, calling instead for a rejection of 
hedonism and for a morality that invoked both the asceticism of ancient spiritual masters 
and the altruism of the Maoist era. The primary goal of practice became spiritual 
accomplishment and entering the ‘Falun world’, while this world became the stage of an 
apocalyptic moral battle between demonic forces and the Great Fa. Where qigong allowed the 
multiplication of practices and fantasies of health, prosperity, and spirituality, and involved 
opening the body to the diffused energies of the cosmos -- ‘collecting qi’ from nature, 
sending and receiving qi between practitioners, dabbling in all types of techniques, symbols, 
and concepts -- Falungong drew lines of division between sensual pleasures and the spiritual 
rewards, through suffering, of exclusive cultivation. Falungong appealed to widespread 
concerns about morality and corruption and proposed a radical alternative to mainstream 
hedonism and materialism.  
In Falungong practice, the moral line of division became the dominant theme, 
structuring the body discipline itself, and tying it to an apocalyptic eschatology which 
resonates with medieval texts describing the imminent destruction of the world before the 
appearance of the True Lord Li Hong, who will inaugurate a new era of joy and longevity11.  
To the body exercises and spiritual concepts of qigong, Li Hongzhi added a social critique 
based on moral fundamentalism. Where the simple, honest and virtuous person was often 
ridiculed and abused by his co-workers, Falungong raised his suffering to the level of a 
heroic spiritual struggle in which he was to resign himself and bear the blows, each insult and 
each wound being a gift of ‘white matter’ which would help him to move a step higher 
toward celestial perfection. All the more so if a Falungong practitioner was verbally or 
physically abused while defending the Fa. Morality was now the central issue, displacing the 
typical qigong concerns with science, paranormal abilities, and tradition. The evolution toward 
moral predication reinforced the tendency to politicization. Falungong discourses of morality 
extended beyond body discipline to social criticism, social problems being perceived in 
China as the result of a decline in the morality of the people in general and of government 
leaders in particular.  
While the qigong movement promoted ideas that were deviant or even heterodox by 
the standards of Marxist orthodoxy, the public behaviour of most qigong advocates, masters, 
and practitioners had followed the norms of orthopraxy12, multiplying webs of reciprocal 
relations with officials, and publicly displaying deference to the social and political order. 
Falungong, on the other hand, broke this logic of interpenetration. By the mid 1990’s 
Falungong began to cease participating in the ritual organization of the post-Mao state 
system. After coasting on the qigong boom and benefiting from the political legitimacy and 
networks of the state-sponsored China Qigong Research Society, which had played an 
instrumental role in launching him as a national celebrity in qigong circles, Li Hongzhi, having 
attained a sufficiently large following and reputation, withdrew from the association in 1996. 
By putting an end to his collaboration with state-sponsored qigong associations, he placed 
himself outside the circuit of personal relations and financial exhanges through which 
masters and their organizations could find a place within the state system. Instead, he sought 
to establish an autonomous social body, the great body of the Dharma or Fa, in which each 
disciple becomes a Fa-particle, in which the practitioners’ bodies were the theatres of both 
personal spiritual struggle and of the apocalyptic battle between the demonic old world and 
the righteous Fa.  
While refusing to engage with the state according to its rules, Falungong 
endeavoured to remain at centre stage, offering the power of its Fa to society and even to 
the state, organizing spectacular public ‘experience-sharing’ gatherings and, through its 
protests against critical media, opposing any attempt to diminish its social influence. 
Falungong sought to replace the interpenetrating flows of power of the multiplication 
paradigm with a unidirectional flow, from the cosmic power of the Fa, through Li Hongzhi 
and outward to society.  
Where the multiplying logic of qigong scrambled the lines of division within the state, 
revealing and reinforcing its own multiplying tendencies, the state’s response to Falungong 
mirrored the latter’s logic of division, the one reinforcing the other. This polarising dynamic 
confirmed the vision of a world divided between the ‘saved’ disciples of Li Hongzhi and the 
world possessed by demons. And the repeated protests by followers, both before and after 
the official crackdown beginning in July 1999, at newspaper offices, around Zhongnanhai, 
on Tiananmen Square – which led to a hardening of the CCP’s lines of division – drew 
official power into a moral battle pitting the demonic oppressor against suffering martyrs. 
And in return, in the years following the repression, Falungong became further radicalized, 
launching a movement to haemorrhage the CCP to death by encouraging mass defections of 
its members. This campaign was spearheaded by the media outlets managed and staffed by 
Falungong activists, notably the overseas Chinese newspaper Epoch Times, which widely 
distributed a series of anti-CCP tracts (Epoch Group 2005). 
 Although one emerged from the other, qigong and Falungong are thus two distinct 
movements with their own logic within distinct sets of historical and political circumstances. 
While qigong and Falungong are clearly both social and both movements, they offer 
fascinating cases for questioning assumptions about dichotomies between ‘state’ and 





This essay was written with the hope that applying the concept of social movements 
might help us to better understand the relationship between religiosity and society in 
contemporary China. The two cases I have examined, of temple revivals and the qigong 
movement, though very different from each other, represent two ends of the wide spectrum 
of Chinese popular religiosity. Neither clearly fits conventional definitions of ‘religion’, and 
both have, more often than not, found their continued existence and legitimacy by adopting 
the labels of cultural heritage, tourism, economic development, medicine, sports, or science. 
Nor do they fit conventional definitions of social movements. But applying the concept of 
social movements has been useful, not merely to conclude, as is inevitable when categories 
derived from Western history are applied to other parts of the world, that the category itself 
should be questioned, but to help us to derive models of social agency that would better 
describe the dynamics at play when Chinese religious groups find themselves in agonistic 
relationships with the state. This paper has suggested that two types of dynamic can be 
observed around Chinese religious practices of the body and the temple: ‘division’ and 
‘multiplication’, showing that the two often coexist asymmetrically, with ever-extending 
arborescent lines of division ironically opening ever more zones of multiplication. On the 
other hand, the symmetrical mirroring of lines of division by the Chinese state and popular 
movements collapses the possibility of a social resolution and polarizes into an apocalyptic 
struggle in which each side tries to exterminate the other.   
 
References 
Aijmer, Goran, and Virgil K. Y.  Ho (2000), Cantonese Society in a Time of Change. Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University Press. 
Anagnost, Ann (1987), ‘Politics and Magic in Contemporary China.’ Modern China 13 (1): 40-
61. 
---. (1994), ‘The Politics of Ritual Displacement.’ In Charles F. Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and 
Helen Hardacre (eds.), Asian Visions of Authority, 221-254. Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press.  
Brook, Timothy, and B. Michael Frolic (eds.) (1997), Civil Society in China. Armonk, NY: M. 
E. Sharpe. 
Brownell, Susan (1998), ‘The Body and the Beautiful in Chinese Nationalism: Sportswomen 
and Fashion Models in the Reform Era’. China Information 13 (2/3): 36-57. 
 
Campbell, Colin (1972), ‘The Cult, the Cultic Milieu and Secularization.’ In Michael Hill (ed.) 
A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain. London: SCM Press. 
Chevrier, Yves (1995), ‘La question de la société civile, la Chine et le chat du Cheshire.’ 
Etudes chinoises 14 (2): 154-251. 
Chau, Adam Yuet (2003), ‘Popular Religion in Shaanbei, North-Central China.’ Journal of 
Chinese Religion 31: 39-79. 
--- (2005a), ‘The Politics of Legitimation and the Revival of Popular Religion in Shaanbei, 
North-Central China.’ Modern China 31 (2): 236-278. 
--- (2005b), Miraculous Response: Doing Popular Religion in Contemporary China. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Cingcade, Mary L. (1998), ‘Tourism and the Many Tibets: The Manufacture of Tibetan 
“Tradition”’. China Information 13 (1): 1-24. 
 
Cohen, Jean (1996), ‘Mobilization, Politics and Civil Society: Alain Touraine and Social 
Movements.’ In Jon Clark and Marco Diani (eds.) Alain Touraine, 173-204. London: 
Falmer Press. 
Dean, Kenneth (1993), Taoist Ritual and Popular Cults of Southeast China. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
--- (1997), ‘Ritual and Space: Civil Society or Popular Religion?’ In Timothy Brook and B. 
Michael Frolic (eds.) Civil Society in China, 172-192. Armonk, N.Y. & London: M. E. 
Sharpe. 
--- (1998), Lord of the Three in One: the Spread of a Cult in Southeast China. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press.  
--- (2001), ‘China's Second Government: Regional Ritual Systems in Southeast China.’ In 
Ch'iu-kui Wang, Ying-chang Chuang and Chung-min Chen (eds.) Shehui, minzu yu 
wenhua zhanyan guoji yantaohui lunwenji, 77-107. Taipei: Hanxue Yanjiu Zhongxin.  
--- (2003), ‘Local Communal Religion in Contemporary South-East China.’ In Daniel 
Overmyer (ed.) Religion in China Today, 338-358. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Dean, Kenneth, and Thomas Lamarre (2003), ‘Ritual Matters’. In Thomas Lamarre and Nae-
hui Kang (eds.) Impacts of Modernities. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari (1980), Mille Plateaux. Capitalisme et Schizophrenie 2. Paris: 
Editions de Minuit.  
Duara, Prasenjit (1988), Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.  
---- (1991), ‘Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity -- The Campaigns Against 
Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century China’. Journal of Asian Studies 50(1): 67-
83. 
DuBois, Thomas (2005), The Sacred Village: Social Change and Religious Life in Rural China. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Eng, Irene, and Yi-Min Lin (2002), ‘Religious Festivities, Communal Rivalry, and 
Restructuring of Authority Relations in Rural Chaozhou, Southeast China.’ Journal of 
Asian Studies 61 (4): 1259-1285. 
Epoch Group (2005), Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party: Broad Press Inc. Available 
online at www.theepochtimes.com, tuidang.dajiyuan.com 
Evasdottir, Erika (2004), Obedient Autonomy: Chinese Intellectuals and the Achievement of Orderly 
Life. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
Feuchtwang, Stephan, and Mingming Wang (2001), Grassroots Charisma: Four Local Leaders in 
China. London & New York: Routledge. 
Flower, John Myers (2004), ‘A Road is Made: Roads, Temples, and Historical Memory in 
Ya'an County, Sichuan.’ Journal of Asian Studies 63 (3): 649-685. 
Flower, John Myers, and Pamela Leonard (1998), ‘Defining Cultural Life in the Chinese 
Countryside: the case of the Chuan Zhu Temple.’ In Eduard B. Vermeer, Frank 
Pieke and Woei Lien Chong (eds.), Cooperative and Collective in China's Rural 
Development: Between state and private interests, 273-290. Armonk, NY & London: M. E. 
Sharpe. 
Gong, Xuezeng (2003), Shehui zhuyi yu zongjiao. Beijing: Zongjiao wenhna chubanshe. 
Goossaert, Vincent (2000), Dans les temples de la Chine. Histoire des cultes, vie des communautés. 
Paris: Albin Michel. 
--- (2006), ‘1898: The Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion?’ Journal of Asian Studies 
65(2): 307-336. 
Hertz, Ellen (1998), The Trading Crowd: An Ethnography of the Shanghai Stock Market. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jing, Jun (1996), The Temple of Memories: History, Power, and Morality in a Chinese Village. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Johansson, Perry (1998), ‘White Skin, Large Breasts: Chinese Beauty Product Advertising as 
Cultural Discourse’. China Information 13 (2/3): 59-84. 
 
Kuah-Pearce, Khun Eng (2000), Rebuilding the Ancestral Village: Singaporeans in China: London: 
Ashgate. 
Lang, Graeme, Selina Chin Chan, and Lars Ragvald (2005), ‘Temples and the Religious 
Economy’. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 1:1 :Article 4, published online 
at www.bepress.com/ijrr. 
 
Liu, Tik-sang (2005), ‘Associating Local Traditions with State Apparatus: A Way of 
Revitalizing Popular Religion in South China.’ Paper presented at the conference on 
'Religion' in China: Rethinking Indigenous and Imported Categories of Thought. Fairbank 
Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, 21-22 May 2005.  
Madsen, Richard (1998), China's Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Oommen (1996), ‘Social Movements in a Comparative Perspective: Situating Alain 
Touraine.’ In Jon Clark and Marco Diani (eds.) Alain Touraine, 111-125. London: 
Falmer Press. 
Palmer, David A. (2007), Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Perry, Elizabeth (2002), Challenging the Mandate of Heaven. Social Protest and State Power in China. 
Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. 
Prazniak, Roxann (1999), Of Camel Kings and Other Things. Rural Rebels against Modernity in Late 
Imperial China. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Seidel, Anna K. (1969-70), ‘The image of the Perfect Ruler in Early Taoist Messianism: Lao-
tzu and Li Hung.’ History of Religions 9 (2 & 3): 216-47. 
Seiwert, Hubert Michael (2003), Popular religious movements and heterodox sects in Chinese history. 
Leiden; Boston: Brill. 
Siu, Helen F. (1990a), ‘Recycling Ritual.’ In P. Link, Richard Madsen and Paul Pickowicz 
(eds.) Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the Peoples' Republic. Boulder: 
Westview. 
---. (1990b), ‘Recycling Tradition: Culture, History, and Political Economy in the 
Chrysanthemum Festival of South China.’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 
(1990): 765-794. 
Tarrow, Sydney (1994), Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Tilly, Charles (1975), “Rural Collective Action in Modern Europe”, in Joseph Spielberg and 
Scott Whiteford (eds.), Forging Nations: A Comparative View of Rural Ferment and Revolt, 
9-40. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.  
 
Touraine, Alain (1981), The Voice and The Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
-- (1988), The Return of the Actor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
--- (2002), ‘The Importance of Social Movements.’ Social Movement Studies 1 (1): 89-95.  
Tsai, Lily Lee (2002), ‘Cadres, Temple and Lineage Institutions, and Governance in Rural 
China.’ The China Journal  48: 1-27. 
Vandermeersch, Leon (ed.) (2004), La société civile face à l'Etat dans les traditions chinoise, japonaise, 
coréenne et vietnamienne. Paris: EFEO. 
Wang, Yeu-Farn (1993), China's Science and Technology Policy, 1949-1989: Aldershot Avebury. 
Weller, Robert (1994), Resistance, Chaos and Control in China. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press. 
--- (1999), Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press.  
Yang, Mayfair Mei-hui (1994), Gifts, Favors, and Banquets. The Art of Social Relationships in China. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
--- (2000), ‘Putting Global Capitalism in its Place. Economic Hybridity, Bataille, and Ritual 
Expenditure.’ Current Anthropology 41(4). . 
--- (2004a), ‘Goddess Across the Taiwan Strait: Matrifocal Ritual Space, Nation-state, and 
Satellite Television Footprints.’ Public Culture 16 (2): 209-238. 
 --- (2004b), ‘Spatial Struggles: State Dishenchantment and Popular Re-appropriation of 
Space in Rural Southeast China.’ Journal of Asian Studies 63 (3): 719-755. 
Zhu, Xiaoyang, and Benjamin  Penny (eds.) (1994), ‘The Qigong Boom.’ Thematic issue of 
Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, 27 (1). 
Zürcher, Erik (1983), ‘ “Prince Moonlight”. Messianism and Eschatology in Early Medieval 



















                                                
1 I am grateful to Gilles Guiheux and K. E. Kuah-Pearce, and the participants at the conference on emerging 
social movements in China, for encouraging me to look more deeply into the relations between Chinese 
religion and social movement theory. I am also indebted to Kristofer Schipper, Ken Dean, Vincent Goossaert, 
Mayfair Yang, and Adam Chau for many insights and stimulating discussions which have helped to shape the 
ideas discussed in this paper.   
2 Buddhism, Taoism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam. 
3 For a critique of the notion of peasant resistance as applied to China, see Weller 1994.  
4 A similar encounter is described in Dean 1998: 266. See Feuchtwang & Wang 2001 for an in-depth study of 
the charisma of temple managers.  
5. On government sponsorship of festivals, see also Siu 1990a, 1990b.   
6 See Lang, Chan & Lagvald 2005 for several examples of state-sponsored construction of Wong Tai Sin 
temples in mainland China.  
7 Constraints on field research in China may be a factor accounting for the fact that most field studies have 
focused on relatively successful cases of temple-state relations, rather than on cases of overt conflict.  
8 For a detailed discussion on the difficulties in estimating numbers of practitioners, see Palmer 2007: 258-261.  
9 This understanding of the qigong milieu is taken in analogy to the Western ‘cultic milieu’ categorized in 
Campbell 1972: 122.  
                                                                                                                                            
10 See Hertz 1998: 71-93 for a discussion of the notion of the ‘fever’ in relation to the stock trading craze of the 
early 1990’s.   
11 Falungong’s apocalyptic doctrine can be traced back to the Buddhist eschatology of the kalpas or universal 
cycles, which, in Chinese heterodox sects, have pointed to social chaos and corruption as foreboding the end of 
the present kalpa inaugurated by the Sakyamuni Buddha, and have preached paths to salvation and preparation 
for ushering in the new kalpa. On the Li Hong prophecies, see Seiwert 2003: 82-84, 86-89; Seidel 1969-70; and 
Zürcher 1983: 3.  
12 Anthropologist Erika Evasdottir, in her study of Chinese intellectuals (Evasdottir 2004), defines orthopraxy 
as ‘the express formulation of action to conform to commonly held standards’. Based on Evasdottir’s 
conceptualization, I take orthopraxy to mean the collective performance of political order – an order which is 
not the product of an outside or transcendent law, but the fruit of the harmonized performance of the actors 
themselves, including both the rulers and the ruled. In orthopraxy, order ceases to exist when the actors 
themselves cease to perform it.  
